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Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts
Privacy, Dignity, and the Fourth Amendment
John D. Castiglione*
The principles ... affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They.. . apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property ....
And what, other than civil suit, is the "effective deterrent"
of [a police officer's] violation of an already-confessed
suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him prompt
access to counsel? Many would regard these violated
rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded
upon in one's nightclothes .... 2
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2005, the head marshal of the Supreme Court,
Pamela Talkin, hand-delivered a letter to the White House, a letter
which contained just three sentences:3
Dear President Bush: This is to inform you of my decision
to retire from my position as an associate justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States effective upon the
nomination and confirmation of my successor. It has been
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The author currently practices at Latham & Watkins, LLP, in New
York. I would like to thank all those who contributed ideas and advice,
especially Professor Cynthia Lee and Eric Waldo, currently serving as clerk to
Judge Ann Aldrich of the Northern District of Ohio. All errors are my own.
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Bradley, J.).
2. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006) (Scalia, J.).
3. Richard W. Stevenson, Court in Transition: The Overview; O'Connor
to Retire, Touching OffBattle Over Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al.
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a great privilege, indeed, to have served as a member of the
court for 24 terms. I will leave it with enormous respect for
the integrity of the court and its role under our
constitutional structure.
Sincerely, Sandra Day O'Connor4
And just like that, the career of the first woman ever appointed
to the Supreme Court came to a close.
It would be almost six months before Justice O'Connor
actually left the Court.5 And yet, within a matter of weeks of her
departure, the Supreme Court would embark upon an extraordinary
process of curtailing generally accepted Fourth Amendment
protections that Justice O'Connor would almost surely have
questioned, and in one case prevented. In Samson v. California,6
decided just weeks after Justice O'Connor left, the Court
determined that parolees may be subjected to warrantless,
suspicionless searches of their person and property, by any
government official, at any time.7 This 6-3 decision marked yet
another chapter in the Court's recent history of declaring entire
groups of individuals almost completely unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. In Hudson v. Michigan8 -in what was a surprise to
almost every observer--the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not mandate exclusion of evidence discovered following a
knock-and-announce violation.9 What was most surprising about
the Court's decision in Hudson was the majority's willingness to
call into question the central role of the exclusionary rule to Fourth
4. Text of the letter taken from Nina Totenberg, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor Retires, NAT'L PuB. RADIo, July 1, 2005, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=4726127 (last accessed June 18, 2007).
Following his receipt of the letter, Mr. Bush held a brief phone conversation with
Justice O'Connor, telling her, "For an old ranching girl, you turned out pretty
good," a reference to her roots in El Paso, Texas. Stevenson, supra note 3.
5. Following Justice O'Connor's announcement, her intended replacement,
John Roberts, was nominated for Chief Justice following William Rehnquist's
death. Samuel Alito was then nominated as Justice O'Connor's successor, and
was confirmed on January 30, 2006. David Stout, Alito Is Sworn in as 110th
Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at Al.
6. 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
7. Id. at 2202.
8. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
9. Id. at 2168.
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Amendment analysis. Coming in a 5-4 decision that was re-argued
after Justice O'Connor left the Court, Justice Alito, O'Connor's
replacement on the Court, supplied the crucial fifth vote for the
majority that O'Connor probably would have withheld.' ° And just
like that, the continued vitality of one of the most well-established
tenants of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence--the exclusionary
rule-was back in play almost a century after it was established."
Looking back at the 2005-2006 term, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky quipped that it was a "mixed year" for criminal
defendants.' 2  On the contrary, 2006 was actually quite a bad
year-not only for criminal defendants, but for anyone concerned
with the steady tilt of the Court away from an even moderately
robust interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Along with
creating yet another categorical exclusion of an entire class of
individuals from meaningful Fourth Amendment protection (that
being parolees in Samson), 2006 inaugurated what promises to be a
years-long struggle within the Court for one of the core tenants of
modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the exclusionary rule.
More fundamentally, the first wave of Fourth Amendment cases
clearly indicated the Roberts Court's thinking vis-Ai-vis the balance
between personal privacy and government power through law
enforcement.
In this article, I critique the change of course in criminal
procedure chartered by the Roberts Court in these decisions. In
Part I, I examine the Court's decision in Samson, arguing that the
majority's decision rests on unsupportable conceptions of the
efficacy of suspicionless searches and the role they play in
effectuating the penological and rehabilitative goals of parole.
10. It appears likely from statements made in the first oral argument in
Hudson that Justice O'Connor probably would have voted to apply the
exclusionary rule. See infra notes 97-98; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Criminal
Justice, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 522, 522 (2007).
11. The exclusionary rule was first announced by the Court in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that evidence seized by federal
officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial in
federal cases). The rule was held applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 335, 344
(Summer, 2006).
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While few would argue that Samson is a particularly
groundbreaking decision, it is nonetheless notable for its overly
broad conception of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness." In Part
II, I examine the Court's opening salvo against the exclusionary
rule in Hudson. I assert that Hudson was the first shot across the
bow in what promises to be a long campaign by the "conservative"
bloc of the Court' 3 to undermine, and ultimately overrule, the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
In Part III, I argue that the Court's decisions in these cases show a
clear preference of a majority of the Court for the government's
prerogatives in law enforcement to the determinant of individuals'
legitimate expectations of privacy, dignity, and autonomy. Both
13. By referencing the "conservative" bloc of the Court (which includes
Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and sometimes Justice
Kennedy), I make no representation as to whether these jurists are in any way
"conservative," as the term is commonly used. I seek not to lump these Justices
into umbrella political categories that may or may not be a perfect fit. However,
I think that at this point the nomenclature "conservative bloc" has gained much
traction when describing this group of justices and, for ease of language, I will
occasionally use this term as a short-hand descriptor. A good justification for
the use of this terminology was provided by Professor Kerr:
My sense is that we tend to apply terms like "liberal" and
''conservative" to individual Justices by looking at those cases and
asking if Justice X's votes consistently try to pull the law to the left or
the right compared to a world in which the Court took no cases. If a
Justice consistently votes to pull the law to the right, we label that
Justice a conservative; if a Justice consistently votes to pull the law to
the left, we label that Justice a liberal; and if a Justice's votes reveal no
consistent patterns, we label that Justice a moderate.
What this means, I think, is that calling someone a "conservative
Justice" does not mean that the Justice is conservative politically or votes
for Republicans. Conversely, calling a Justice a "liberal" does not mean
that the Justice is liberal politically or votes for Democrats. In the case of
Supreme Court Justices, the label is just a shorthand signaling that the
Justice's votes tend to have the effect of pushing the law in a direction
that favors the policy preferences on one side or the other. Thus, we
might find a Justice shifting from being a liberal to a conservative even
if the Justice's views don't change. A good example is Justice
Frankfurter, who was considered a liberal in the 1930s but a conservative
in the 1950s in part because the political valence of judicial restraint had
shifted.
Posting of Orin S. Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1163447802.shtml (Nov. 13, 2006, 4:06 EST).
[Vol. 68
2007] HUDSON AND SAMSON: THE ROBERTS COURT 67
Samson and Hudson offer tantalizing clues as to the new Roberts
Court's general theory of the balance of power, if you will,
between the state and the individual, a theory which promises to
carry over into the "new generation" of Fourth Amendment cases
soon to come before the Court.
I. CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF PAROLEES FROM FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTION: SAMSON V. CALIFORNIA14
A. Background-Probationer's Rights Under the Fourth
Amendment
In Samson v. California, the Court held, 6-3, that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a
suspicionless search of a parolee.' 5  The Court's decision in
Samson was not a total surprise; the groundwork for the case had
been laid five years earlier in United States v. Knights,16 where the
Court endorsed a search regime for probationers that required only
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to search. In
Knights, the Court upheld a California law providing that
individuals on probation could be stopped and searched at any time
during the probationary period upon reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, as opposed to the usual requirement of probable
cause. 17  The Court found that such searches were reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for a unanimous Court,' 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist held
in Knights that probation was merely one stop along a "continuum"
of possible punishments facing a convicted criminal, ranging from
"solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few
hours of mandatory community service." 19 The Court used the
14. 126 S. Ct. 2194 (2006).
15. Id. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Scalia. Justices
Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented.
16. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
17. Id. at 122.
18. Justice Souter filed a one-paragraph concurrence dealing with a
secondary issue in the case. Id. at 122-23.
19. Id. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)
(Scalia, J.)).
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standard privacy versus governmental interest balancing test to
assess the reasonableness of the reduced-suspicion search. The
Court found first that probationers, based on their position on the
"continuum," had a lowered expectation of privacy. Next, the
Court held that it was "reasonable to conclude" that allowing
searches of probationers on less than probable cause of criminal
activity would "further the two primary goals of probation-
rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal
violations." 20 As such, it was reasonable to subject probationers to
searches, and those searches need not be supported by probable
cause or a warrant. Indeed, the Court specified that the officer
need not be the individual's probation officer; rather, any officer
with knowledge of the individual's status as a probationer could
search without suspicion.2'
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Knights was the Court's
holding that it did not need to resort to a "special needs" analysis
to justify suspicionless searches of probationers. In Griffin v.
Wisconsin, decided seven years prior to Knights, the Court held
that warrantless searches of a probationer's home were
permissible; 22 the doctrinal hook, so to speak, was that the state
law authorizing the search fulfilled the "special need" of
monitoring probationers. 23  "Special needs" was, by the time
Griffin was decided, a well-established exception to the general
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.24 Under Knights, however, the Court abandoned the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 121.
22. Grifin, 483 U.S. at 874.
23. Id. at 875-76.
24. Griffin was also the case in which Justice Scalia first articulated the
"continuum" theory of criminal punishment--a concept that would be
instrumental in the Court's opinions in Knights and Samson:
Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a
continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in
a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community
service. A number of different options lie between those extremes,
including confinement in a medium- or minimum-security facility, work-
release programs, "halfway houses," and probation--which can itself be
more or less confining depending upon the number and severity of
restrictions imposed.
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requirement of "special needs" 25 and held that a "general" Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis was all that was needed to
determine that probationers did not enjoy full rights under the
Amendment and could be searched at any time on reasonable
suspicion alone.
26
B. Samson v. California
2 7
With this precedent less than five years old, the Court decided
Samson v. California. In Samson, another California law
mandated that every prisoner eligible for release on parole "shall
agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole
officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night."
28
Individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the parolee was not a
prerequisite to search under the law. The facts of the case were
quite similar to Knights. Petitioner Donald Samson, on parole
following a conviction for felony possession of a firearm, was
walking down a street with a woman and child. He was
approached by a local police officer, who knew that Mr. Samson
was on parole and believed him to be subject to an outstanding
warrant. 29 After stopping Mr. Samson and confirming that he was
not subject to an outstanding warrant, the officer nevertheless
searched Mr. Samson, based solely on Mr. Samson's status as a
Id. at 874. Incidentally, one might think that this continuum should include
capital punishment, although neither Justice Scalia nor Chief Justice Rehnquist
was impolitic enough in their opinions to mention it.
25. Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-18 ("In Knights' view, apparently shared by
the Court of Appeals, a warrantless search of a probationer satisfies the Fourth
Amendment only if it is just like the search at issue in Griffin-i.e., a 'special
needs' search conducted by a probation officer monitoring whether the
probationer is complying with probation restrictions. This dubious logic-that
an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a particular search implicitly holds
unconstitutional any search that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin's express
statement that its 'special needs' holding made it 'unnecessary to consider
whether' warrantless searches of probationers were otherwise reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
26. Id. at 118-19.
27. 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
28. Id. at 2196 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)).
29. Id.
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parolee. During the search, the officer discovered a cigarette box
in Mr. Samson's pocket containing methamphetamine.
30
At the suppression hearing, the trial court refused Mr.
Samson's motion to suppress the drugs. Citing the California
law,31 the court found that the search was proper even though the
arresting officer lacked any suspicion that Mr. Samson was
engaged in criminal activity (apart from the fact that he was a
parolee). The jury convicted Mr. Samson, and he was sentenced to
seven years imprisonment. 32  The California Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that a suspicionless search of a parolee is
"reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long
as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing."
33
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. Writing
for six members of the Court,34 Justice Thomas began by invoking
the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. "Whether a search
is reasonable is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests." 35 Pursuant to this approach,
and relying heavily on Knights, Justice Thomas found that, by
virtue of their status as parolees on the "continuum" of state-
imposed punishments, parolees have a diminished expectation of
privacy. In effect, parolees fall somewhere between prisoners
and probationers, and since neither of those groups enjoy a full
30. Id.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000) (requiring parolees "to be
subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time
of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without
cause.").
32. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.
33. People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 14, 2004).
34. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas.
35. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 (citations omitted).
36. d. at2198-99.
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expectation of privacy under the Court's precedents, neither do
parolees.
Justice Thomas then looked to the substantial governmental
interests in allowing warrantless, suspicionless searches of
parolees. "As the [high] recidivism rate [in the state of California]
demonstrates, most parolees are ill prepared to handle the pressures
of reintegration. Thus, most parolees require intense supervision."
37
This supervision, Justice Thomas asserted, necessarily includes
being exposed to suspicionless searches. "Imposing a reasonable
suspicion requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees
greater oplortunity to anticipate searches and conceal
criminality." 8  Because this would impede the California
legislature's goal of promoting reintegration, suspicionless
searches are a "reasonable" response, and therefore consistent with
the Fourth Amendment.
39
2. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, 40 Justice Stevens focused first on the
fact that the majority opinion marked a clear break from precedent.
"What the Court sanctions today is an unprecedented curtailment
of liberty. '4 1 Justice Stevens noted that in the cases most heavily
relied on by the majority, Knights and Griffin, the Court had
stopped short of sanctioning completely suspicionless searches of
probationers (a close corollary to parolees) by any and all law
enforcement officials. As to Griffin, Stevens noted that "at least
the state in Griffin could in good faith contend that its warrantless
searches were supported by a special need conceptually distinct
from law enforcement goals generally. ' 42  And as to Knights,
Stevens noted that, under that decision, reasonable suspicion was
required to search probationers.43  In Samson, however, the
majority jettisoned both the "special needs" requirement from
37. Id. at 2200.
38. Id. at 2201.
39. Id. at 2202.
40. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J., and Souter, J.).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2203 n. 1.
43. Id. at 2204.
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Griffin and the "reasonable suspicion" requirement from Knights:
"Ignoring just how 'closely guarded' is that 'category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches' the Court for
the first time upholds an entirely suspicionless search unsupported
by any special need.""
Justice Stevens then addressed the majority's determination of
a parolee's lowered expectation of privacy. "Combining faulty
syllogism with circular reasoning, the Court concludes that
parolees have no more legitimate an expectation of privacy in their
persons than do prisoners. However superficially appealing that
parity in treatment may seem, it... rests on an intuition that fares
poorly under scrutiny."4 5 Justice Stevens continued:
Threaded throughout the Court's reasoning is the
suggestion that deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is
part and parcel of any convict's punishment. If a person
may be subject to random and suspicionless searches in
prison, the Court seems to assume, then he cannot complain
when he is subject to the same invasion outside of prison,
so long as the State can imprison him .... This is a vestige
of the long-discredited "act of grace" theory of parole.46
Justice Stevens argued that the majority short-circuited a true
Fourth Amendment analysis by simply assuming that deprivation
of Fourth Amendment rights is necessarily a component of
criminal punishment without turning to a "special needs" analysis,
which had been the Court's chosen doctrinal method in Grifin, or
hewing to the Court's decision in Knights that at least reasonable
suspicion is required to search.
C. Critiquing Justice Thomas' Opinion
1. The Court Assumes, Without Evidence or Analysis, That
Suspicionless Searches Deter Effective Monitoring of Parolees
The majority's opinion in Samson is less than compelling. To
begin, Justice Thomas never adequately explains why requiring
44. Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)).
45. Id. at 2202-03.
46. Id. at 2206 (citations omitted).
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government officials to have individualized, objectively reasonable
suspicion before searching a parolee would handicap the
government's penological and rehabilitative interests. While he
asserts, uncontroversially, that "a State has an 'overwhelming
interest' in supervising parolees" and that "a State's interest in
reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and
positive citizenship . . . [warrants a privacy intrusion] that would
not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment, ' '47 he fails
to explain, or point to any evidence beyond the California
legislature's passing of the law, why requiring government
officials to be able to point to at least some objective suspicion of
wrongdoing by the parolee would hinder these objectives.
While Justice Thomas is no doubt correct to assert that the
legislature, not the courts, are the appropriate forum for
determining the wisdom of a particular policy (such as the need to
subject parolees to intense supervision), it is nevertheless inherent
in the nature of the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry for the
Court to determine whether the legislature's chosen method of
effectuating its policy choice is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's command of "reasonableness." This means that the
Court must make an attempt to determine whether the methods
chosen by the legislature (in this case, authorizing suspicionless
searches) serve a constitutionally permissible end (that all searches
be reasonable). Simply stating that the legislature has determined
that "a requirement that searches be based on individualized
suspicion would undermine the State's ability to effectively
supervise parolees and protect the public" 48 is of no help when
facing the constitutional question. In essence, Justice Thomas'
complete lack of scrutiny of the legislature's stated claims about
the necessity of the search regime means that the legislature
becomes the arbiter of whether its methods are permissible under
the Fourth Amendment: the very act of the legislature passing the
law means the state thinks it was necessary, and that makes it
reasonable! The circularity of this argument is apparent.
As to the substance of his argument, Justice Thomas asserts
that "[i]mposing a reasonable suspicion requirement, as urged by
47. Id. at 2200 (majority opinion).
48. Id. at 2201.
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petitioner, would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate
searches and conceal criminality.'A9  Unfortunately, Justice
Thomas neglects to explain (or offer any evidence) as to the basis
upon which he makes this assertion. The Court determined in
Knights that probationers are at least entitled to reasonable
50suspicion of wrongdoing before they are searched. Why is the
bar lower for parolees? Is it because they are more likely than
probationers to be engaging in criminal activity when searched?
The Court declines to mention whether parolees actually commit
more crimes than probationers. Similarly, as to "concealing" their
criminality, 51 do parolees generally hide evidence faster than
probationers when police approach? Do parolees somehow have
the ability to sense police from farther away than probationers? If
so, that might offer a compelling reason to lower the suspicion bar.
If not, why is it necessary to lower that bar before a search can
commence? Justice Thomas fails to specify.
While Justice Thomas suggests that the recidivism problem in
California indicates that those convicted of crimes are more likely
to commit crimes again (thus making it more reasonable to search
them without individualized suspicion), it is difficult to see what
role that should play in a Fourth Amendment analysis. All the
concept of a "high recidivism rate" indicates is that those who have
been convicted of a crime are more likely to be convicted a crime
again; it emphatically does not mean that those who have
committed a crime are necessarily more likely to engage in
criminal behavior than other individuals.52 Indeed, propensity to
commit criminal acts (which is really the concept Justice Thomas
is basing his argument on) is not generally seen as sufficient to
49. Id.
50. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
51. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at2201.
52. Justice Stevens touches on this argument in his Samson dissent:
The Court devotes a good portion of its analysis to the recidivism rates
among parolees in California. One might question whether those
statistics . . . actually demonstrate that the State's interest is being
served by the searches .... That said, though, it has never been held
sufficient to justify suspicionless searches. If high crime rates were
grounds enough for disposing of Fourth Amendment protections, the
Amendment long ago would have become a dead letter.
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2207 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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support a search under the Fourth Amendment; rather, it is the
likelihood that an individual is currently committing a criminal act
that is determinative. 53 The majority cites no evidence (outside its
miscast argument concerning recidivism) that parolees are more
likely than anyone else to be committing or taking steps to commit
a crime at a given moment in time-the essential benchmark of
whether a particular search is reasonable.
5 4
While Justice Thomas attempts to salvage his point by noting
that parolees are, in theory, deemed to have acted more harmfully
than probationers, 55 he fails to explain why this makes a difference
to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Is a search more "reasonable"
because a "more-bad actor" is targeted? Do parolees "deserve"
less Fourth Amendment protection than others? 56  If that is the
logic to be used, then should not individuals with criminal records
be subject to a lower standard of suspicion than the rest of us?
Surely former law-breakers "deserve" less protection than law
abiding citizens. To most observers, though, the concept that some
people are more "worthy" of Fourth Amendment protection than
others is a constitutional non-starter, as it should be.
53. If "propensity" to commit criminal acts were the standard by which
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is judged, then one might imagine that serial
offenders who are no longer subject to any state-imposed punishment should
nevertheless be subject to a lowered-suspicion standard, since they could be said
to be more likely to commit crimes in the future. Such individuals are not,
however, subject to any lowered level of Fourth Amendment protection.
54. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) ("[T]o
accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure.").
55. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 (citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d
1048, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that parolees, in contrast to probationers,
"have been sentenced to prison for felonies and released before the end of their
prison terms" and are "deemed to have acted more harmfully than anyone except
those felons not released on parole")).
56. The fact that prisoners themselves have essentially no rights under the
Fourth Amendment is due not to the fact that they are the "most bad actors";
rather, it is the unique environment of the prison itself that makes it necessary
for normal Fourth Amendment protections to be discarded. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding that traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis is inapplicable to prisoners because the recognition of any
privacy right is incompatible with the concept of incarceration and the needs of
penal institutions).
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2. The "Continuum " Theory of Privacy Remains Undeveloped
by the Court
Implicit in the argument that parolees have a diminished
expectation of privacy is the idea that since parolees could have
been denied parole by the state, the fact that they are granted
parole must mean that the state is free to impose any burden on the
parolee that could have been imposed in prison. As the Court
stated:
A California inmate may serve his parole period either in
physical custody, or elect to complete his sentence out of
physical custody and subject to certain conditions. Under
the latter option, the inmate-turned-parolee remains in the
legal custody of the California Department of Corrections
through the remainder of his term.. .. 57
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that Justice Thomas
seems to suggest that inmates actually have a meaningful choice in
whether or not to accept the terms of their parole, one can see how
Justice Thomas simply assumes that because parole falls
somewhere between imprisonment and probation on the
"continuum" of punishments, it a priori means that a diminished
expectation of privacy exists. While this determination might in
theory be justifiable, the fact is that the Court in Samson never
bothers to explain just why that is the case. Why do parolees
necessarily have the same subjective expectation of privacy as
prisoners? The Court provides no answers. While one might
assume that parolees have the same, or less, expectation of privacy
than probationers, one might also assume that they have
substantially more of an expectation than prisoners. Should not
that in turn mean that at least some level of objective suspicion is
necessary? The Court in Samson unhelpfully makes assumptions
and determinations about these relative levels of expectation of
privacy without substantial analysis. This lack of foundational
analysis for a central proposition of the Court's decision is
unsatisfying to say the least, and it undermines the majority's
assertion that Samson follows logically from precedent.
57. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199 (citations omitted).
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3. Despite the Court's Insistence, Samson Allows for Arbitrary
and Capricious Searches of Parolees
Justice Thomas also fails to persuade when he attempts to insist
that there are meaningful safeguards preventing arbitrary searches
of parolees. One major concern raised by the petitioners was that
the California law allowed officers to search on a mere whim, the
ultimate evil protected against by the Fourth Amendment.
58
Justice Thomas felt that the law contained adequate protection.
"The concern that California's suspicionless search system gives
officers unbridled discretion.., is belied by California's prohibition
on 'arbitrary, capricious, or harassing' searches." 59 The flaw in this
reasoning is obvious. While one might imagine a parolee bringing
a successful claim for harassment under the law,60 it is hard to
understand how a parolee might bring a successful claim arguing
that he or she has been subject to "arbitrary" or "capricious"
searches, given that Justice Thomas himself strongly intimates that
the only real criteria for conducting the search is that the officer
has knowledge that the individual is a parolee. 6 1 And so, Justice
Thomas expects us to believe that the California law offers
meaningful protection against arbitrary or capricious searches,
even though the only thing the government would have to establish
to support the search is that the officer knew the suspect was a
parolee.
58. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITES STATES CONSTITUTION 92-97 (1937) (noting that
one of the primary justifications for the Revolution and the subsequent adoption
of the Fourth Amendment was revulsion for the unlimited search power of
government officials in the colonial period).
59. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 ("It is not the intent of the Legislature to
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of
harassment." (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(d) (West 2000))).
60. Possible scenarios in which a parolee might bring a successful claim for
harassment include situations where repeated searches by police occur in a short
time frame, where police engage in extremely invasive or destructive searches,
the execution of unnecessary searches at the workplace, etc.
61. Id. at 2202 n.5 ("Under California precedent, we note, an officer would
not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent knowledge that
the person stopped for the search is a parolee.").
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While one might conceive of a situation where an officer
"accidentally" searches a parolee whom he doesn't actually know
to be a parolee (thus making the search "arbitrary" within Justice
Thomas's definition, and making it illegal), such a search would be
excluded regardless of the searchee's status--if the officer had no
other suspicion factors to point to, the search would be illegal as to
anyone. Of course, if the officer did have other individualized
search factors to point to that constituted probable cause, the
parolee's parole status is irrelevant, and the search would be
permissible. Therefore, it appears as though the Court sanctions
"arbitrary and capricious" searches of parolees-in the sense that
officers can permissibly search parolees for any reason, or no
reason at all, at any time, as long as the government official knows
of the searchee's status as a parolee-a necessary condition for
implicating Samson's holding in the first place.62 While one might
not object to such a regime as a matter of preference or policy, it is
not clear at all that such a regime comports with the Fourth
Amendment, by the Court's own reasoning.
4. What Happened to the Special Needs Doctrine?
Ultimately, the most compelling-and simplest-argument for
removing the usual Fourth Amendment requirement of
individualized suspicion 63 is that parolees are, in effect, special
cases; because they have been sentenced to prison and
(presumably) cannot reintegrate into society successfully without
intense supervision, searches on less-than-individualized suspicion
are necessary.64 Applying this doctrinal tool to the California law
62. "To say that th[e] evils [of suspicionless searches] may be averted
without that shield is, I fear, to pay lip service to the end while withdrawing the
means." Id. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. By "usual" requirement, I mean "most times"--as Justice Thomas
points out in Samson: "[A]lthough this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless
searches in limited circumstances, namely programmatic and special needs
searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in
which searches absent individualized suspicion could be 'reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 2201 n.4 (majority opinion).
64. I am not convinced that this is necessarily a true proposition, as my
argument immediately preceding this section indicates; I believe it is not at all
clear that subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches is a necessary element of
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in Samson would have been the most straightforward method of
resolving the case. Normally, a finding by the Court that "special
needs" exist outside those of pure law-enforcement allows for an
otherwise impermissible curtailment of some or all Fourth
Amendment protections. The Court has not been shy about
recognizing special needs in other contexts.65  And yet, while
Justice Thomas's argument seems tailor-made for a special needs
analysis--replete with references to the penological and
reintegrationist goals of the statute--the Court makes clear that
"general" Fourth Amendment doctrine was sufficient to determine
that parolees may be subjected to suspicionless searches: 66 "Nor do
we address whether California's parole search condition is justified
as a special need under Griffin v. Wisconson, because our holding
under general Fourth Amendment principles renders such an
examination unnecessary.,
67
The question, then, is why the Court chose to abandon the
special needs analysis in this case. While Justice Thomas asserts
that "general" Fourth Amendment analysis is sufficient to decide
an effective parole regime. As the petitioners in Samson argued, the majority of
states, as well as the federal government, required some level of suspicion for
parolee searches. Id. at 2201. Nevertheless, applying a special needs analysis
would have at least supplied the precedential hook that that majority opinion in
Samson lacked.
65. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) (holding that a policy requiring all students who participated in
competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable
means of furthering the school district's important interest in preventing and
deterring drug use among its schoolchildren, and therefore did not violate Fourth
Amendment); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("For
example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the
program was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement'."); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(upholding the random drug testing of student-athletes under the "special needs"
doctrine); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions
to the warrant and probable-cause requirements for a search when "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," make those requirements
impracticable (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring))).
66. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201.
67. Id. at 2199 n.3.
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the case, just as it was in Knights, 68 this seems too facile an
explanation if taken on its face. In this case, using the special
needs doctrine would have been the simplest ground on which to
decide the case. The Court could have held, probably
uncontroversially, that managing parolees outside of prison is, in
essence, a unique undertaking, and that suspicionless searches
were necessary to fulfill that need. This would have comported
comfortably with the Court's precedent and probably attracted at
least one (Justice Stevens) and possibly all of the dissenters.
Instead, the Court chose to apply the general "reasonableness" test.
Two explanations are possible. First, it could be the case that
the majority realized that attempting to show how suspicionless
searches are at all reasonably necessary to promote the "special
needs" of a parole regime was a tough sell, as it were, for the
reasons outlined above.70 It would be far better to simply show
that it is somehow generally "reasonable" to subject convicted
criminals to suspicionless searches, than to have to show how
those searches actually promote the state's penological and
rehabilitative interests. As the dissent argues, the nature of the
California law (allowing any law enforcement official to search
any parolee at any time, without suspicion of criminal activity) is
far too broad to reasonably comport with the special need of
supervising parolees. "Had the State imposed as a condition of
parole a requirement that [prisoners] submit to random searches by
his parole officer ... the condition might have been justified...
under the special needs doctrine." 72  Similarly, had the parole
68. 534 U.S. at 117-18.
69. "We held in Knight-without recourse to Hudson--that the balance
favored allowing the State to conduct searches based on reasonable suspicion.
Never before have we plunged below that floor absent a determination of
'special needs."' Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. See supra Part I.C.1.
71. "Special needs" doctrine allows for searches on less-than-full suspicion
when legitimate needs "beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the
probable-cause requirement impracticable." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
725 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). Searches conducted pursuant to "special needs"
must be reasonable in scope. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989).
72. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2207.
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board singled out particularly dangerous or untrustworthy inmates
for suspicionless searches, one might make the argument that the
program is tailored to advancing the specific need of supervising
the individual parolees that require supervision the most. The fact
that the majority eschews the special needs analysis indicates that
the majority knew that a compelling "special needs" case possibly
could not, in fact, have been made.
A second, more comprehensive explanation is simply that the
majority takes a very limited view of the scope of Fourth
Amendment vis-A-vis the individual's right to privacy and
autonomy. In other words, the Justices composing the majority in
Samson did not need to resort to a special needs analysis because
they believe that, as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment
provides relatively little protection to the individual when the
government can articulate an important-sounding reason to impose
upon the individual's interests. The unbalanced balancing
approach taken by the Court has been criticized as insufficiently
protective of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as needlessly
complicating what should be a straightforward application of
special needs doctrine in most cases.73 This argument is revisited
in more detail below.74
II. TAKING ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: HUDSON v. MICHIGAN
Regardless of its flaws, Samson was a widely anticipated
decision. Once Knights held that probationers did not have full
Fourth Amendment rights, it was only a matter of time before the
Court extended that basic rationale to parolees. The Court's
decision in Hudson v. Michigan, however, caught much of the
legal community by surprise. While there may have been clues,
here and there, that certain Justices--Justice Scalia in
particular 75-- had been planning to call the vitality of the
exclusionary rule into question, the fact that the newly-composed
73. See, e.g., Antoine McNamara, The "Special Needs" of Prison,
Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 209 (2007) (arguing that searches of
probationers and parolees should be justified under the special needs doctrine,
and that alternative justifications are unsound and unnecessarily complex).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. See infra note 106.
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Court moved so decisively---and so quickly--following Justice
O'Connor's departure was surprising. In this section, I will
examine the Court's decision in Hudson, including the dissent and
Justice Kennedy's enigmatic concurrence. I will then critique
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority, centering my comments
on his cavalier endorsement of alternative remedies for knock-and-
announce violations and the low bar set by the majority for the
restriction of individual rights in the face of law enforcement
prerogatives.
A. Existing Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Carving exceptions out of the exclusionary rule has been
something of a pet project for the Court since the rule was
incorporated to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.76 Finding a consistent
theme to these carve-outs is difficult.7 7  Ostensibly, the Court
applies the exclusionary rule only "where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served., 7 8 The test for making that
determination allows for the application of the rule only "where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.' ' 79
Whether the Court's decisions hew closely to this formulation are
largely a function of one's personal opinion; since Mapp, the Court
has found the rule inapplicable, for example, in civil trials,8 0 grand
76. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77. See e.g., Donald L. Doemberg, The Right of the People: Reconciling
Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 259, 260 (1983) (exploring the "inconsistency in the Court's treatment of
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies"); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a
Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9
BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 201, 201 n. 1 (2005) ("I am certainly not the first to observe
the irrational patchwork covered by the exclusionary rule." (citing Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994)
(arguing that the Court-created exceptions to the exclusionary rule are
inconsistent and subject to personnel shifts on the Court))).
78. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
79. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
80. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) ("[T]he judicially
created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil
proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement
agent of another sovereign.").
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jury proceedings, 81 when police reasonably rely on a warrant
unsupported by probable cause,82 when police reasonably rely on
statutory authority,83 when the evidence seized would have been
inevitably discovered,84 when the illegal actions of police are
sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the evidence, 85 and so
forth. What is clear, however, is that the Court had consistently
upheld the central role of the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment analysis.
B. Hudson v. Michigan-The Frontal Assault on the Exclusionary
Rule Begins
Given the Court's history in this regard, a holding that an
exclusionary remedy was not available for knock-and-announce
violations seems like just another log on the pile. Why, then,
should one be concerned about the Court's decision in Hudson? I
argue that the majority opinion in Hudson betrayed a disturbingly
hostile attitude by the conservative bloc of the new Roberts Court
to the very idea of the exclusionary remedy itself. While one
might legitimately question whether an exact fit exists between a
knock-and-announce violation and an exclusionary remedy in this
particular case, the majority opinion in Hudson makes clear that
the newly-composed Court is beginning a serious re-evaluation of
the exclusionary rule's place in the constitutional order and offers
clues as to a majority of the Court's view of personal privacy vis-A-
81. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52 (holding the exclusionary rule
inapplicable to grand jury proceedings).
82. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912-22 (1984) (adopting a good faith exception
where officers reasonably rely on a warrant later found to be unsupported by
probable cause).
83. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (establishing a good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule where police rely on
statutory authority).
84. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (establishing an exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when the evidence illegally seized would
have been inevitably discovered by authorities).
85. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that the
confession of a suspect that was sufficiently attenuated from illegal arrest could
be admitted at trial).
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vis the government's interest in searches, surveillance, and general
law enforcement.
1. Setting the Stage
It all started innocently enough. In late 2005, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the appeal of People v. Hudson,86 a state case
in which the Michigan Supreme Court, in direct contravention of
every state court (save one)87 and every federal circuit (save one),88
reaffirmed its decision that the exclusionary rule was an
inappropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations. 89 The
attorney who argued the case to the Supreme Court on behalf of
the petitioner, David A. Moran, has written that he felt strongly
that this case would be nothing more than an opportunity for the
Court to rebuke the Michigan court's outlier decision while
cleaning up some doctrinal loose ends emerging from Wilson v.
Arkansas,9° the case that "constitutionalized" the knock-and-
announce rule a decade prior.
9 1
86. No. 246403, 2004 WL 1366947 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), lv.
appeal denied, 692 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. 2006).
87. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999).
88. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002).
89. Hudson, 2004 WL 1366947, at *1 (citing People v. Vasquez, 602
N.W.2d 376 (1999); People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999)).
90. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
91. David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other
Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO S. CT.
REV. 283,295-96 (2006):
I must confess that I really never saw it coming. When an attorney
named Richard Kom telephoned me out of the blue in February 2005 to
ask if I would take a look at a case, People v. Hudson, that he had just
lost in the Michigan courts and assess whether it would make a good
vehicle for challenging the Michigan Supreme Court's 1999 decision in
People v. Stevens, I did not hesitate. After all, I had long been critical
of Stevens, which had held that exclusion of evidence was not an
appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce
violation. Stevens, in effect, gave the Michigan police carte blanche to
violate the knock-and-announce rule, the ancient common law
requirement that the police must knock and generally allow residents to
open their doors, thereby sparing residents a forcible and terrifying
police entry. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision seemed
especially vulnerable given that the United States Supreme Court had
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The facts of Hudson were simple enough. After obtaining a
warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of
the defendant, Booker Hudson, the police arrived at his home,
announced their presence, and, after waiting just "three to five
seconds," entered Mr. Hudson's home.92 This was a clear knock-
and-announce violation; 93 indeed, Michigan conceded as much at
trial and throughout the appeal.94 Moreover, the crime for which
Mr. Hudson was eventually convicted, possession of crack
cocaine, was "relatively minor."95 All told, this should have been a
fairly straightforward case of applying Wilson and holding that the
exclusionary rule applied to knock-and-announce violations, just as
almost every court in the country assumed it did.96
twice suppressed evidence seized after knock-and-announce violations,
and had, just eleven years ago, unanimously held that the knock-and-
announce rule was part of the Fourth Amendment in Wilson v.
Arkansas.
Since the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to suppress evidence
seized after a knock-and-announce violation was out of step with the
U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson and with the rule followed in
every other state and federal circuit, except one, I felt confident that the
Court, if it granted certiorari, would pull Michigan back into line. My
confidence was enhanced even further when the Court granted my
certiorari petition just four days after it issued Halbert v. Michigan, in
which the Court reversed another Michigan Supreme Court decision
that was radically out of line with the position taken by other state and
federal courts. While I certainly realized that it was possible I could
somehow lose Hudson, it never occurred to me that I could effectively
kill an 800-year-old rule protecting personal privacy and
simultaneously put the entire exclusionary rule at risk.
(citations omitted).
92. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
93. Id. at 2163.
94. Id.
95. Hudson was found by the judge at his bench trial as having possessed
five rocks of crack cocaine and was sentenced to probation. Moran, supra note
91, at 297-98.
96. Prior to oral argument, Moran believed that the only interesting question
in the case was whether the Michigan Supreme Court had unduly expanded the
"inevitable discovery" doctrine to encompass any situation in which a knock-
and-announce violation occurred. As he stated:
Therefore, I thought Hudson was about two things: the importance of
maintaining an effective deterrent so that police would respect the
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And at the first oral argument in January, 2006, that seemed to
be the case. While Justice Scalia floated the idea of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (hereinafter § 1983) being an adequate remedy to knock-and-
announce violations, it appeared that at least five (and possibly six)
Justices were supportive of the idea that the exclusionary rule was
the proper remedy.97 As fate would have it, though, shortly after
oral argument Justice O'Connor, a probable supporter of Mr.
Hudson's argument,98 resigned from the Court. After Justice
knock-and-announce rule; and, more abstractly, the proper scope of the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. What I did not
realize was that the case would put the exclusionary rule itself into
play.
Id. at 299.
97. It was clear that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were
supportive, and it appeared as though Justice O'Connor and perhaps Justice
Kennedy were as well. For a transcript of the first oral argument, see United
States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159
(2006) (No. 04-1360), 2006 WL 88656.
98. Justice O'Connor indicated her sympathy for Mr. Hudson's position at
the first oral argument. From that argument, the following exchange took place
between Justice O'Connor and David B. Salmons, Assistant to the Solicitor
General, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the Respondent:
MR. SALMONS: No, Your Honor. The knock-and-announce
requirement is-we take no issue with that. That is required by the
fourth amendment. With regard-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well-
MR. SALMONS: -to deterrence-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -but in this very case you had an officer who
said it was his regular policy-
MR. SALMONS: Well-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -never to knock and announce-
MR. SALMONS: That's not-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -to just go in. So, if the rule you propose is
adopted, then every police officer in America can follow the same
policy. Is there no policy protecting the homeowner a little bit-
MR. SALMONS: Of course the-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -and the sanctity of the home-
MR. SALMONS: Of course there is-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -from this immediate-
MR. SALMONS: -Your Honor, and that is not-
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: -entry?
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O'Connor was replaced by Samuel Alito, the Court ordered the
case re-argued. It soon became clear at re-argument that Justice
Scalia, with a new-found ally, had grand plans in mind for Mr.
Hudson. As Dean Moran recounts:
At the re-argument ... it became clear to me for the first
time that the case was no longer about the knock-and-
announce rule or the inevitable discovery doctrine when
Justice Scalia asked me, in a series of questions, why the
threat of internal police discipline would not convince
officers to comply with the knock-and-announce rule.
When I responded that such a notion contradicts the very
premise of Mapp v. Ohio, the seminal 1961 case in which
the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states
because other remedies had proven worthless at deterring
Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Scalia replied,
"Mapp was a long time ago. It was before section 1983
was being used, wasn't it?" 9
Just a few weeks later, the Court delivered its opinion. The
result was unexpected, to say the least.' 0
0
2. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Chief Justice Roberts, began by noting that the knock-and-
MR. SALMONS: -- our position. And we, respectfully, would argue
that that's not an appropriate way to conduct the deterrence analysis.
Even just on the terms of deterrence, we think that suppression here
would be a disproportionate remedy. And that's because, as this Court
has repeatedly recognized, the officers already have an incentive,
inherent in the nature of the circumstances, to announce and delay
some period of time before entry.
Id. at 58-59.
99. Moran, supra note 91, at 299-300 (citations omitted).
100. See, e.g., M.K. Jamison, New Developments in Search & Seizure Law,
2006-APR Army Law. 9, 25 (2006) (noting, in 2004, that the Court's October,
2005 term will see a case (Hudson) dealing with the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule). Needless to say, the Court had other ideas
about what to do with Hudson.
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announce rule itself was not at issue; rather, the only question was
one of remedy.' 10 Specifically, the question was whether excluding
evidence obtained in the home following a knock-and-announce
violation was appropriate. 10 2 From the start, Justice Scalia made his
lack of enthusiasm for the exclusionary rule apparent. "Suppression
of evidence.., has always been our last resort, not our first impulse
.... [We] have ... repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly
toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a
high obstacle for those urging its application."'
0 3
The crux of the majority's opinion dealt with the causal
connection between a violation and the application of the
exclusionary rule. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not
automatically applied when evidence is obtained illegally because
the causal connection "can be too attenuated to justify
exclusion,"' 0 4 the Court found that while violations of the warrant
requirement bear a direct relation to the discovery of evidence
(because "citizens are entitled to shield their persons, houses,
papers, and effects" until a valid warrant has been issued), 10 5
violations of the knock-and-announce rule do not bear such a direct
relationship because the purpose of the rule is the "protection of
human life and limb," both of the homeowner and the entering
agent. 10
6
Turning next to the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule in
this context, Justice Scalia noted that exclusion is appropriate only
"where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social
costs. ' 1 7 He found the costs were considerable; not only would
incriminating evidence be lost, but "a constant flood of alleged
failures to observe the rule" would deluge the courts, offering
101. Hudson v. Samson, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162-63 (2006).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2163 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 2164.
105. Id. at 2165 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
106. Id. Justice Scalia continued: "What the knock-and-announce rule has
never protected, however, is one's interest in preventing the government from
seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were
violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable." Id.
107. Id.
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some defendants a virtual "get-out-of-jail free" card. 108  As
opposed to these high costs, Justice Scalia urged that there is
virtually no deterrence benefit to applying the rule, since the
requirement can be suspended whenever there is a reasonable
possibility that evidence would be destroyed or violence would
erupt. Just because the Court applies an exclusionary remedy to
other violations in different contexts to deter illegal conduct does
not mean that exclusion is a valid remedy here:
And what, other than civil suit, is the "effective deterrent"
of a police [officer's] violation of an already-confessed
suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him prompt
access to counsel? Many would regard these violated
rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded
upon in one's nightclothes .... 109
Addressing the elephant in the room, Justice Scalia argued that
denying an exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations
would not eviscerate the knock-and-announce rule itself. Given
the availability of § 1983 remedies to constitutional violations by
state officers, as well as the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2000) [hereinafter § 1988(b)], which authorizes plaintiffs
attorney's fees in civil rights cases, and the prospect of
"increasingly professional" police forces, the majority asserted
(although they admit they do not know for certain) that violations
of the knock-and-announce rule will be adequately deterred in the
absence of an exclusionary remedy."l
0
Justice Scalia concluded by tying Hudson to three cases
previously decided by the Court: Segura v. United States,II New
York v. Harris,112 and United States v. Ramirez.113 These cases,
108. Id. at 2165-66.
109. Id. at 2167.
110. dat2167-68.
111. 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained pursuant to an
illegal entry into the home by police need not be excluded if the police had
sufficient information to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal entry).
112. 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that in the situation where police entered a
home illegally and arrested the suspect, that suspect's statements at the
stationhouse need not be excluded because the exclusionary rule was "designed
to protect the physical integrity of the home").
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Justice Scalia argued, stood for the "proposition that an
impermissible manner of entry [into the home] does not
necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule .... These cases, all
involving some sort of illegal police behavior during entry into the
home, and where the evidence discovered was deemed admissible,
were cited primarily to show that "the reason for a rule must
govern the sanctions for the rule's violation."''1 5  In cases like
Hudson, where they do not, exclusion is not proper.
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote against the
petitioner.11 6 He joined most of Justice Scalia's opinion (save for
the portion citing Segura, Harris, and Ramirez as support for the
majority's reasoning),1 17 in addition to adding some thoughts of his
own in concurrence.
To begin, Justice Kennedy offered assurances that the knock-
and-announce rule was still alive and well. "Two points should be
underscored with respect to today's decision. First, the knock-and-
announce requirement protects rights and expectations linked to
ancient principles in our constitutional order." 18 Next, he assured
his audience that the exclusionary rule maintained its central role
in Fourth Amendment analysis: "[T]he continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not
in doubt."'119 While Kennedy noted the historic import of the
knock requirement, he found that suppression was unjustified.
"Under our precedents, the causal link between a violation of the
knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too
113. 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (discussing in dicta that property destruction during
a home search only mandates exclusion of recovered evidence when a sufficient
causal relationship between the property destruction and the discovery of the
evidence exists). This portion of the opinion was joined only by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.
114. Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2170.
115. Id. at 2169 n.2.
116. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2168-70 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id.
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attenuated to allow suppression.' 20 While the dissent was right to
note the constitutional sanctity of the home, the fact that other civil
remedies exist (such as § 1983 claims), and the fact that no
"demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations" has been
shown, Justice Kennedy argued that suppression is too strong a
medicine for this particular constitutional violation.'
21
4. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer began by arguing that
the Court's holding "represents a significant departure" from
precedent. 122  Clearly, it was undisputed that the Fourth
Amendment requires police to knock-and-announce their presence
prior to executing a warrant in the home.123 And so, given the
Court's reasoning in Wilson that "a court must 'conside[r]'
whether officers complied with the knock-and-announce
requirement 'in assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure," ' 124 and given the command of Weeks and Mapp that an
unreasonable search or seizure generally requires exclusion of
evidence gleaned therefrom, Justice Breyer argued that an
exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations flows
naturally from the Court's precedent: "Why," Justice Breyer asked,
"is [the] application of the exclusionary rule any less necessary
here?"
, 12 5
Turning to the deterrence values of alternative remedies,
Justice Breyer questioned whether knock-and-announce violations
will be under-deterred. "What reason is there to believe that those
remedies (such as private damages actions under § [1983]), which
the Court found inadequate in Mapp, can adequately deter
120. Id.
121. I discuss Justice Kennedy's concurrence in detail infra Part II.C.4.
122. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (unanimously
holding that the Fourth Amendment requires police to knock-and-announce their
presence prior to executing a warrant in the home).
124. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, 514
U.S. at 934).
125. Id, at 2174.
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unconstitutional police behavior here?' ' 126 Noting that the Court
failed to cite a single case where a plaintiff had collected more than
nominal damages stemming from a violation,127 Justice Breyer
criticized the Court for simply assuming that civil claims will
adequately protect the integrity of the knock-and-announce without
any supporting evidence. Critically, Justice Breyer admonished
the Court for its over-reliance on the idea of the "substantial social
costs" incurred by applying the rule here. He argued that the costs
incurred are no different than the costs incurred by any application
of the exclusionary rule: evidence might be lost, and the guilty
might go free. 128  Justice Breyer recognized the majority's
formulation of these costs as a broader argument against exclusion:
"The majority's 'substantial social costs' argument is an argument
against the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle itself.'
129
Finally, Justice Breyer criticized the majority assertion that
knock-and-announce violations are not the "but for" causation of
the discovery of evidence that typically leads to exclusion.
Besides the fact that this is a questionable empirical claim at
best,130 Justice Breyer argued that it is of limited relevance:
[W]hether the interests underlying the knock-and-announce
requirement are implicated in any given case is, in a sense,
beside the point . . .where a search is unlawful, the law
insists upon suppression of the evidence consequently
discovered, even if that evidence or its possession has little
or nothing to do with the reasons underlying the
constitutionality of the search.131
In short, Justice Breyer believed that the values underlying the
Fourth Amendment are served by exclusion of evidence obtained
pursuant to illegal entry by police whether or not the actual
126. Id. (citing Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 126-29 (2003) (arguing
that there is no "meaningful alternative" to exclusion)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2177.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2177-79.
131. Id. at2181.
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discovery of evidence is causally related to the knock-and-
announce violation.' 
32
C. Critiquing Hudson
Two main grounds of criticism arise from the majority's
opinion in Hudson. First is the majority's insistence that civil
remedies will adequately protect individuals' right under Wilson to
be informed of police presence before entry. Second, the majority
uses a social cost versus deterrence benefit balancing test that will
in theory almost never result in the application of the exclusionary
rule. Whether or not this is by design,' 33 the majority's
methodology has called into question the continued vitality of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations,
and provides compelling evidence of the "conservative" bloc's
conception of individual privacy and dignity vis-A-vis the interests
of government and law enforcement.
1. Despite the Court's Insistence, the Efficacy of Civil Suits to
Remedy Knock-and-Announce Violations is Uncertain
To begin, Justice Scalia's assertion at oral argument and in his
opinion that § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for victims of
knock-and-announce violations 134 is dubious at best. Justice Scalia
effectively argues that, in the absence of an exclusionary remedy,
every time the police commit a knock-and-announce violation (an
event one might expect to occur more frequently following
Hudson),135 the aggrieved party will have the knowledge,
132. The dissent concludes by noting that the Court's precedents allow for no-
knock entries where the danger of violence or the destruction of evidence are
reasonable possibilities, thus blunting the United States' argument that the
exclusionary rule is too harsh a remedy for knock-and-announce violations given
the possibility of loss of evidence. Id, at 2181-82. The dissent also criticizes the
majority's reliance on Segura, Harris, and Ramirez. Id. at 2183-86.
133. I argue that the majority intentionally placed the continued vitality of
the exclusionary rule in question, based on the content of the opinion and Justice
Scalia's statements at oral argument. See infra Part III.A.
134. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at2167.
135. Given that Hudson removes one deterrent to violations (however
effective one believes it to be), logic suggests that this would have the effect of
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resources, ability, and time to successfully bring a § 1983 action in
federal court. 13 6 The dissent in Hudson recognized this reasoning
as pure sophistry. "What reason is there to believe that those
remedies (such as private damages actions under § 1983), which
the Court found inadequate in Mapy, can adequately deter
unconstitutional police behavior here?".. The dissent continues:
[T]he majority, like Michigan and the United States, has
failed to cite a single reported case in which a plaintiff has
collected more than nominal damages solely as a result of a
knock-and-announce violation.... As Justice Stewart, the
author of a number of significant Fourth Amendment
opinions, explained, the deterrent effect of damage actions
"can hardly be said to be great," as "such actions are
expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and
rarely successful.
1 38
Responding to this critique, Justice Scalia would have us
believe that § 1988(b), which provides for attorney's fees for civil
rights plaintiffs, offers an adequate incentive for attorneys to
pursue knock-and-announce claims in federal court. 1 3 9  Justice
Scalia notes that "[t]he number of public-interest law firms and
necessarily increasing the number of violations, at least in the short term.
Whether increased use of civil remedies will, in the long term, reduce the
number of violations (as Justice Scalia intimates, but cannot bring himself to
fully argue) is obviously an open question, and will be for some time.
136. Id. ("Dollree Mapp could not turn to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for meaningful
relief; Monroe v. Pape, [which] began the slow but steady expansion of that
remedy, was decided the same Term as Mapp. It would be another 17 years
before the § 1983 remedy was extended to reach the deep pocket of
municipalities . . . . "). One might be right to question Justice Scalia's
enthusiasm even for this proposed remedy, given his backhanded tone.
137. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kamisar, supra note 126, at
126-29 (arguing that "five decades of post-Weeks 'freedom' from the inhibiting
effect of the federal exclusionary rule failed to produce any meaningful
alternative to the exclusionary rule in any jurisdiction" and that there is no
evidence that "times have changed" post-Mapp)).
138. Id. at 2174-75 (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1388 (1983)).
139. Id. at 2167 (majority opinion).
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lawyers who specialize in civil-rights grievances has greatly
expanded."' 140 The insincerity of this argument is apparent. Even
given the existence of § 1988(b), relatively few defendants would
have the wherewithal and the resources to find representation and
bring such claims to their conclusion. Indeed, what would be the
point? By the time the civil case was tried or settled, the suspect in
question would have been acquitted of the charge, already
released, or still be imprisoned. Does Justice Scalia believe that a
civil suit for nominal damages (the cost of a broken door, say) will
be pursued by most (or even some) of these individuals, especially
if they are no longer incarcerated, even if they had the prospect of
representation? 14  It would hardly seem worth the trouble, given
the slim prospects for substantial recovery. Prospects for pro se
plaintiffs are even dimmer. 42 Justice Scalia's assertion that there
are a "greatly expanded" number of public interest law firms who
specialize in civil rights grievances is equally un-compelling.
Justice Scalia provides no evidence (nor even explicitly argues)
that there are sufficient numbers of attorneys available and willing
to handle the new civil suits that he claims will take the place of
suppression motions, nor does he provide any guidance as to
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 111 (2003) (noting plaintiffs' high failure rate and theoretically high
barriers to success in civil actions for exclusionary violations); William C.
Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 828 (2000) (agreeing with the Court's finding in
Leon that once a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, the injury is
essentially irreversible and cannot easily be repaired).
142. Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An
Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Court, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157,
176-87 (1972) (arguing that the vast majority of pro se prisoners are unable to
state valid claims of civil rights violations); Richard Rosen, Reflections on
Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 237, 284-85 (2006) ("Unable to hire a lawyer or
investigator, with no right to an appointed lawyer, the typical indigent,
convicted, and innocent person is unlikely to be able to uncover any evidence
that would prove that he or she did not commit the crime. Even if the
wrongfully convicted person is fortunate to find evidence that casts doubt upon
guilt, and can either initiate litigation pro se or find a lawyer willing to take the
case, the person still has to navigate the perilous waters of retroactivity, time
limits, procedural defaults, finality, difficult burdens of proof, and downright
judicial hostility in order to gain relief.").
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whether the Court would be willing to re-establish an exclusionary
remedy for violations should that unknown number of civil-rights
attorneys dip below a certain level---or whether such a thing could
conceivably be measured accurately.
Similarly, putting aside for the moment the question of
efficacy, the Court's preference for post hoc civil remedies
undermines another main rationale for its decision--the danger of
a "flood" of knock-and-announce suppression claims. Justice
Scalia argues that "[i]mposing that massive remedy [exclusion]...
would generate a flood" of claims for suppression. 143 However,
most criminal cases that go to trial will include a suppression
hearing anyway; there would seem to be no great burden in
allowing knock-and-announce claims to be brought alongside other
suppression claims a defendant may have. 144 Given that, until
Hudson, it had been assumed by most courts that an exclusionary
remedy existed for knock-and-announce violations, and given that
the criminal courts have not been suffering from a deluge of
knock-and-announce suppression motions, Justice Scalia is clearly
overstating the threat to judicial economy posed by allowing
exclusion. Indeed, Justice Scalia's judicial economy argument
seems especially disingenuous given his full-blown endorsement
143. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
144. Indeed, Justice Scalia argues that determinations of whether knock-and-
announce violations occurred are inherently more complicated-requiring more
"extensive litigation"--than determining whether, say, the warrant or Miranda
requirements have been fulfilled. "[W]hat constituted a 'reasonable wait time'
in a particular case ... or whether there was reasonable suspicion ... is difficult
for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an appellate court to
review." Id. at 2166.
This argument borders on the absurd. Given the complex and often
contradictory nature of the Court's other criminal procedure jurisprudence-
especially its warrant and Miranda jurisprudence--it simply boggles the mind
that Justice Scalia actually believes that, for some reason, knock-and-announce
motions are more than the criminal court system can handle on a regular basis.
One would be justified, I think, in questioning the sincerity of Justice Scalia's
belief in this line of reasoning.
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of a § 1983 remedy, a far more costly and time consuming process45
than a straightforward suppression motion to the trial court.
2. The Court's Social Cost Versus Deterrence Benefit Analysis
Will Almost Never Result in the Application of the
Exclusionary Rule
More fundamentally, the Court engages in a social cost versus
deterrence benefit analysis that can be expected to preclude the
application of the exclusionary rule in most circumstances. As to
the costs of imposing the rule, Justice Scalia warns that "[i]n
addition to the grave adverse consequences that exclusion of
relevant evidence always entails," including the release of
"dangerous criminals" into society and handicapping police in
effectuating investigations and arrest, "imposing that massive
remedy . . . would generate a flood" of claims for suppression.
146
On the other hand, Justice Scalia claims that deterrence benefits
would be small: since there is not strong incentive for police to
violate the rule, and since civil remedies are available,
147
"deterrence of knock-and-announce violations is not worth a
lot.' ' 148 Justice Scalia clearly signaled his broader intentions at oral
argument when he said that "Mapp was a long time ago. It was
before § 1983 was being used, wasn't it?' 149 Obviously, Justice
Scalia (and, by extension, the four other Justices that signed onto
the reasoning of his opinion) more or less agree with this
sentiment.
The danger in the Court's formulation of this balancing act is
that it by its very formulation favors the government interest over
that of the individual's interest in autonomy, privacy, and
dignity-the essential values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
One could almost always successfully argue that reducing the risk
of letting "dangerous criminals" go free, or reducing the risk of
145. One might be justified in wondering whether the majority was cognizant
of this contradiction and chose to argue it anyway, thus betraying their true
enthusiasm for the knock-and-announce rule in and of itself.
146. Id. at 2165-66.
147. See supra Part II.C.I.
148. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
149. Moran, supra note 91, at 299-300 (citations omitted).
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handicapping the ability of police to effectively investigate crime,
arrest criminals, and protect themselves is more important than
maintaining one individual's interest in some amorphous
conception of privacy. This "thumb on the scale" method of
applying the exclusionary rule has been heavily criticized from
many quarters as being designed to prevent the application of the
exclusionary rule in most circumstances,1 50 as well as being guilty
of false precision.151
3. The Court's Assault on Exclusion Ignores the Judicial
Integrity Rationale of the Exclusionary Rule
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court's assault on
the exclusionary rule is that Hudson fails to address the higher-
order purpose served by the exclusionary rule: judicial integrity.
Terry is worth quoting at length here:
The [exclusionary rule] also serves another vital function-
"the imperative of judicial integrity." Courts which sit
under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary rulings
provide the context in which the judicial process of
inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as
comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves
other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence
in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of
150. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure, and the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. REv. 465, 487 (1999) (arguing that the results of
the Court's balancing test are "quite predictable" given the formulation of the
test itself); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the
Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261, 261 (1998) (describing the
Court's test as "flawed"); Oliver, supra note 77 at 210 (describing the Court's
cost-benefit analysis as a "sham").
151. Norton, supra note 150, at 305-06 ("[T]he exclusionary rule has been
converted into an unprincipled economic version of the Rorschach ink blot,
called the cost-benefit analysis. Using an economic metaphor, but without
measurable empirical data to weigh, the Supreme Court has too often engaged in
what can only be described as adjudication by hunch.").
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legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence,
while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the
constitutional imprimatur. 1
52
While the Hudson majority asserts that civil remedies will be
sufficient to make victims of constitutional violations whole--a
dubious assertion at best 15 3 -its focus on deterrence as the sole
justification for the exclusionary rule is unsatisfying. Judicial
integrity is (or at least was) a key rationale behind the Court's
recognition of the rule, as articulated in Weeks' 54 and Mapp. 
55
Now, one would be justified in arguing that the "judicial
integrity" train has long since left the station when it comes to the
exclusionary rule, given the myriad exceptions to the rule carved
out since Mapp. 56 In none of those rule-limiting decisions does
the Court seem particularly troubled with the idea that the integrity
of the judicial system is compromised when evidence seized in the
wake of illegal police behavior is used against the defendant in one
fashion or another. If that is the case, why should one be
concerned with Hudson? Isn't this case just more of the same?
There are two responses. First, simply because the Court has had a
history of carving exceptions to the exclusionary rule without
paying adequate heed to this fundamental concern does not excuse
the Court from ignoring it in the future; the integrity of the trials
and the judicial process as a whole is central to the purpose of the
152. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
153. See supra Part II.B.1.
154. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ("The tendency of those
who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after
subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of
the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution,
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance
of such fundamental rights.").
155. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (Clark, J.) ("But, as was said in
Elkins, 'there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity.'
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." (citations omitted)).
156. See supra Part II.A.
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rule. As Professor Norton has suggested, "deterrence need not and
should not be viewed as the only, or even the most important,
justification for the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution."' 157 Certainly, the idea of exclusion being necessary
to legitimize criminal trials is a consistent theme throughout the
early exclusion cases. 1
58
Second, the decision in Hudson is qualitatively different than
the Court's prior recognition of exceptions to the rule in ways that
seriously undermine the legitimacy of trials in which evidence
gleaned pursuant to a knock-and-announce violation is admitted.
The removal of an exclusionary remedy in these situations places
the Court in the position of removing an exclusionary remedy at
trial for blatant, knowing constitutional violations by government
officials that lead directly to the discovery of evidence. This
stands in contrast to the Court's prior carve-outs, which allowed
for introduction of illegally obtained evidence in venues outside
the prosecution's case-in-chief,' 59 where the violation and the
discovery of evidence were in some sense "separate" from the
illegal activity of the officers, 160 or where the officers had a good
faith belief that they were acting in accordance with the law.' In
none of these situations could the government official knowingly
violate a suspect's constitutional rights and use the evidence he
157. Norton, supra note 150, at 284.
158. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
159. The exclusionary rule is generally not applicable in grand jury
proceedings (United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1984)), deportation
proceedings (I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)), federal civil tax
proceedings (United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)), habeas corpus
proceedings (Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)), or parole revocation
hearings (Pa. Bd. of Prob. v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)).
160. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (holding that
illegal investigatory behavior by police does not render evidence inadmissible if
discovered independently of the illegal activity; also, evidence that would have
inevitably been discovered is admissible at trial); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that confession of suspect was sufficiently
attenuated from illegal arrest, and thus could be admitted at trial).
161. Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence
obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a facially valid warrant is
admissible, even if the warrant is later found to be unsupported by probable
cause).
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obtains at trial against the suspect in the prosecution's case-in-
chief. Now after Hudson, he can.
Take, for example, a situation where Officer is about to enter
Suspect's home pursuant to a valid warrant. Suspect is engaging in
some sort of illegal activity that could be ceased, without leaving
incriminating evidence, if given a few second's notice, within sight
of the doorway. Officer knowingly chooses not to knock-and-
announce, and enters the home. Suspect is seen by Officer
engaging in the illegal activity. No exceptions to the knock-and-
announce rule apply. At trial, evidence of the illegal activity is
presented. Prior to Hudson, it was assumed that such evidence
could not have been admitted because its discovery was the direct
result of a constitutional violation. With Hudson, the Court has
now sanctioned the use in the prosecution's case in chief of
evidence gleaned as a direct and knowing result of a violation of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
While it seems unsavory to defend the application of the
exclusionary rule in a given instance by arguing that the proper
application of the rule shields illegal conduct from discovery, that
is the natural byproduct of the rule: privacy, dignity, and autonomy
are deemed important enough to justify the possibility that
evidence will on occasion be lost and crimes will go unpunished.
An honest defense of the rule must acknowledge this fact: the
exclusionary rule will seldom---but sometimes-protect criminals.
And that is the way it should be, if the goal of Fourth Amendment
adjudication is the promotion of the legitimate privacy interests of
all individuals, and the maintenance of the integrity of the judicial
system.
4. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence Supports the Notion that the
Exclusionary Rule is in Danger
Some might question whether Hudson truly marks the opening
salvo in an effort to repudiate the exclusionary rule. Is it not a bit
reactionary to assume some grand scheme to overturn such a
fundamental rule based on one case alone? Justice Kennedy's
concurrence provides clues that change is in the air. In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy took pains to emphasize the
historical importance-and the continued vitality-of the knock-
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and-announce rule. And yet, he supported the reasoning of a
majority opinion that removed what had almost universally been
assumed to be the proper remedy for a knock-and-announce
violation: exclusion. 162 What message was Justice Kennedy trying
to send by concurring?
One reading of Justice Kennedy's concurrence supports the
conclusion that he believes that the conservative bloc of the Court
(which he is often mentioned as a part of) 16 3 has called into
question the continued vitality of the rule. Clearly, Justice
Kennedy agreed with the majority's finding that the purposes of
the knock-and-announce rule were not served by excluding
evidence seized from the home in the wake of a violation. "Under
our precedents the causal link between a violation of the knock-
and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to
allow suppression."'' 64 While he ruminates that a "demonstrated
pattern of knock-and-announce violations" might lead the Court to
reconsider its decision in Hudson, he notes that such a move would
force the Court to fundamentally re-evaluate causation doctrine as
applied to Fourth Amendment analysis. He notes that the
prospects of the Court undertaking such a sea-change are a long
shot, at best. 165 The only portion of the Court's opinion Justice
Kennedy takes issue with, apparently, is the Court's analysis of
Segura, Harris, and Martinez, and yet even then he simply
discounts Justice Scalia's analysis as having limited relevance.
The question, then, is why Justice Kennedy concurred. If he
was in substantial agreement with the Court's conclusions, why not
just sign on to the opinion? This is clearly not a case of a
"limiting" concurrence; Justice Kennedy makes clear that he
adopts the majority's reasoning, and notwithstanding his somewhat
off-handed remark that changing situations might someday cause
the Court to reconsider its decision (a position he essentially
discounts in the next sentence), the concurrence leaves no "wiggle
162. See Moran, supra note 91, at 299.
163. See supra note 13.
164. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2170-71 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
165. Id. at 2171.
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room" for lower courts looking to soften the blow of the majority's
opinion.
The only plausible answer is that Justice Kennedy concurred to
make but one point: "[T]he continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not
16in doubt.' ' 6 Justice Kennedy wants to reassure his audience that
the Court's decision does not call the vitality of the rule into
question. This, of course, begs the question: if there really was
nothing to worry about, why does Justice Kennedy find it
necessary to reassure us? If it were clear from the Court's
reasoning that knock-and-announce violations were on a relatively
short, finite list of violations that do not carry a remedy of
exclusion, there would be no reason for him to concur. Most
likely, Justice Kennedy recognizes the tone and substance of the
majority opinion for what they are-a bold indication by four
justices that they believe that application of the exclusionary rule is
not appropriate for most Fourth Amendment violations, and that
the scope of the rule will be dramatically constricted as the new
Court matures. 167 While Justice Kennedy might someday be the
deciding fifth vote that keeps such a fundamental change at bay,
one wonders whether Justice Kennedy could supply that vote while
remaining consistent with the reasoning he endorses in Hudson.
168
166. Id. at 2170.
167. Justice Kennedy's own line of reasoning in Hudson almost assures that
the exclusionary rule is slated for substantial contraction, if not outright
repudiation, despite his apparent preference to the contrary. By endorsing the
majority's social costs versus deterrence benefits methodology, Justice Kennedy
endorses a methodology that will almost never result in the application of the
rule. See supra Part II.C.2.
168. Justice Kennedy has become somewhat notable for agreeing in principle
with a particular line of reasoning, but requiring facts so specific that it becomes
difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to meet the standard. Supreme Court
reporter Dahlia Lithwick summed up this tendency colorfully:
Kennedy, in short, look[ed] poised to do that thing he does-close the
constitutional door to everyone but Elijah.... This brand of jurisprudence
is the Kennedy blue-plate special. He is officially waiting for the perfect
facts before he decides environmental cases, racial gerrymandering cases,
and possibly voluntary desegregation cases, too. He'll agree with the
liberals in theory, agree with the conservatives in specifics, and nobody
will know what to do about anything.
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Nevertheless, it is clear that Justice Kennedy believes, whether he
admits it or not, that the conservative bloc of the Court has
embarked upon a process of dramatically curtailing the
exclusionary rule-a process he will be in the position to ratify or
reject.
III. SAMSON AND HUDSON TOGETHER: THE ROBERTS COURT
DEEMPHASIZES PERSONAL PRIVACY, DIGNITY, AND AUTONOMY
Ultimately, the controversy over the particular remedy for a
knock-and-announce violation is of relatively minor importance in
the larger constitutional order. While one would be justified in
decrying the effective passing of an ancient tenant of security in
the home, 169 it seems as though essentially allowing police to
proceed into a suspect's home without announcing their presence
and waiting a few seconds is a somewhat marginal curtailment of
liberty, considering the widespread use of no-knock warrants and
the broad "exigent circumstances" exception to the knock-and-
announce rule, both of which allow police officers to enter a
suspect's home unannounced if they reasonably believe that
announcing their presence will present a threat of violence or will
lead to the destruction of evidence.170 Likewise, with regard to the
Court's holding in Samson, the question of whether parolees have
access to full (or even just some) Fourth Amendment rights-in
particular the right not to be searched without cause-was
something of a foregone conclusion given the Court's precedent,
and does not, at first glance, seem to bode especially ill for the
future of the Republic.
The unspectacular nature of these rulings on the surface
obscures their far-reaching implications, only some of which are
Dahlia Lithwick, Affirmative Inaction: Anthony Kennedy Is Sort of Horrified by
Voluntary School Desegregation, SLATE, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.slate.com/
id/2154853/index.html.
169. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (decrying the
majority's decision to find no exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce
violations under the Fourth Amendment, despite the roots of the requirement
dating "back to the 13th century").
170. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).
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immediately obvious. What was most notable about Hudson was
the majority's clear indication that the exclusionary rule is now up
for grabs. Whereas the Court before Hudson had essentially
agreed with the fundamental premise of Mapp, that "experience
has taught that [exclusion] is the only effective deterrent to police
misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
would be a mere 'form of words,"' 171 and simply carved out
exceptions to that general rule where appropriate, 72 the majority
opinion in Hudson betrays a much more fundamental opposition to
the application of the rule in most criminal contexts. Similarly,
while one might ultimately agree with the Court's conclusion in
Samson that parolees should be subject to searches on less than
probable cause, the Court's rather cavalier assumption that the
government's interest in supervising parolees overrides the interest
of the parolee to be searched only when there is reason to believe
some sort of criminal conduct is afoot is disturbing. This is
especially true given the fact that the majority's opinion fails to
argue compellingly that such suspicionless searches actually serve
the penological, rehabilitative, and reintegrationist goals of
parole. 173
Looking at these decisions as a whole, two conclusions arise.
The first is that, in the immediate wake of Justice O'Connor's
retirement, the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule is clearly in doubt. The second conclusion, again
growing directly out of the Court's change in personnel, is that
there is now a majority on the Court that will largely accept the
idea that the State's interest in law enforcement overrides the
individual interest in autonomy, dignity, and privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context. While this development has obvious
implications in the "ordinary" criminal procedure context, as
discussed above, it potentially has more far reaching consequences
for the "new generation" of search and seizure cases, only some of
171. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961)).
172. See id. ("Moreover, in some contexts the rule is ineffective as a
deterrent.").
173. Seesupra Part I.C.1.
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which deal in substantial part with "classic" Fourth Amendment
issues. This "new generation" of cases will involve the Court in
decisions on national security, executive powers, detainee rights,
and privacy in the Internet age.
A. The Exclusionary Rule Is Now in Play
The first lesson to take from the Roberts Court's first major
Fourth Amendment cases is that, at least in the short-to-middle
term, the exclusionary rule has reached its apex and may well be
significantly contracted. Justice Scalia made clear at oral argument
and in his opinion that Hudson was about more than the potentially
loose fit between knock-and-announce violations and the
deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule. After remarking
at oral argument to counsel for the petitioner that Mapp was
outdated, 174 Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for the majority
that:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be
forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies
of a legal regime that existed almost a half century ago.175
If Justice Scalia simply believed that knock-and-announce
violations did not fit comfortably with an exclusionary remedy (a
conviction he no doubt holds), there would be no reason to
comment upon the "sins" and "inadequacies" of the exclusionary
regime as a whole. 17 6 Clearly, Justice Scalia is making a larger
174. See Moran, supra note 91, at 299-300.
175. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006).
176. The irony of such a statement being made in an opinion authored by
Justice Scalia is eye-opening. Justice Scalia, of course, has premised his
constitutional philosophy on an "originalist" view of the Constitution, which
(put overly simply) posits that the Constitution should be understood to mean
what it meant at the time it was ratified, and that the text of the document being
construed, the debates that led to its ratification, and the "beliefs, attitudes,
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties" of the adopters of that text are all that
should be consulted when applying the text at hand to the case at bar. Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REv. 353, 357
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point about where he hopes to take the Court's exclusionary
jurisprudence. This is not the first time he has intimated his
intentions. 177 The numbers seem to work in Justice Scalia's favor;
Justice Thomas, his long-time ally, clearly agrees with this
sentiment. While it is difficult to speculate given their short
tenures as of this writing, it appears as though the newest members
of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, also agree
with this roll-back; if they did not, one would expect them to at
least have joined Justice Kennedy in concurrence. And so, Justice
Kennedy, the wavering ally, would be the crucial fifth vote to
severely curtail or overturn exclusion. The prospects of Justice
Kennedy becoming the deciding fifth vote are outlined above.
178
As of this writing, another Court vacancy filled under a Republican
president might well make unnecessary Justice Kennedy's
participation in the Roberts Court's new Fourth Amendment
course.
No longer can it be said, as it was by Professor Oliver just two
years ago, that "[t]he Court has used the opinions creating
(2006). To say that the public should not be forced to "pay for the sins and
inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost a half-decade ago" is to
wonder why Justice Scalia so often "forces" the public to pay for the sins of old
legal regimes in so many other contexts, and why Justice Scalia abandoned his
usual practice in the case of knock-and-announce violations.
One might answer these queries by noting that Justice Scalia takes aim at the
"legal regime" of exclusion erected by the Court in Weeks and Mapp, not the
legal regime surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment itself, which is
the only legal regime inviolate to an originalist. In response, one might in turn
argue that given the patently inadequate remedies available for knock-and-
announce violations in the wake of Hudson, see supra Part II.C, the Court has
essentially read the requirement (which predated the Fourth Amendment) out of
the Constitution--certainly a non-originalist action, bearing in mind that Justice
Scalia himself claims not to dispute that knock-and-announce is a constitutional
requirement. Such a determination, of course, requires one to agree with the
idea that exclusion is the only truly effective remedy yet discovered for Fourth
Amendment violations.
177. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth
Amendment has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the
career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly.").
178. See supra Part II.C.4.
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exceptions to the rule to obscure its continued support for the rule
that it has not abandoned.' 79 Clearly, Hudson marks a shift in the
Court's jurisprudence away from carving exceptions to the rule
towards questioning the basic validity of the rule itself. While it is
still early in the new Court's tenure, the Roberts Court may yet
prove correct Justice Brennan's then-premature proclamation that
the exclusionary rule is soon to be a historical footnote of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 180
B. Hudson and Samson Together-The Court Takes a Dim View
of Personal Privacy and Autonomy
More fundamentally, Samson and Hudson can be seen as
natural outgrowths of the conservative bloc's view of the balance
between constitutionally protected personal privacy and the
interests of government in law enforcement and social control. In
Samson, the Court found that society's interest in supervising
parolees outweighed any expectation of privacy and autonomy that
parolees might subjectively or objectively have; in Hudson, the
Court found that society's interest in effective law enforcement
(through admission of evidence discovered following an illegal
entry into the home) outweighed the citizen's right to be informed
of police presence before entry.
The troubling aspect of the Roberts Court's decisions in these
cases is not so much its substantive determinations about the
particular questions presented, although they are highly
questionable; rather, it is the fact that the Court's formulations of
the balancing test between constitutionally protected autonomy and
law enforcement ensure that in the majority of future cases of this
sort, one can expect that the government's interests will
predominate over those of the individual. In Samson, the Court
determined that it was reasonable for the government to essentially
have the unfettered right to search any parolee at any time. This is
179. Oliver, supra note 77, at 242.
180. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I am left with the uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal
that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door
still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure
cases ... ").
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troubling, not because parolees should be free from intense
oversight, but because it puts government officials in the position
of being able to search someone "just because." In essence, the
Court held that since parolees need oversight, suspicionless
searches are acceptable. The conclusion, however, does not follow
from the premise. If the Court in Samson had bothered to attempt
to tie such searches to the effective supervision of parolees, instead
of simply assuming the relationship to be self-evident, or had
undertaken a good-faith special needs analysis, the decision might
be justifiable. It appears as though the reason the Court did not tie
these together is because it could not; there is at this point no
reason to believe that suspicionless searches play any siglificant
role in the penological or rehabilitative goals of parole.' Given
that the Fourth Amendment has long been construed as being
primarily concerned with preventing searches unless justified by
probability of contemporaneous wrongdoing, this penchant for
automatically equating effective "supervision" with almost
unfettered official discretion to search is worrisome.
The same is true for the Court's decision in Hudson; as the
majority sees it, the government's ability to use evidence
discovered immediately following a blatant illegality trumps the
individual's right to (sometimes) be notified before the police enter
the home. To the extent one believes the exclusionary rule to be
the most effective method yet discovered for deterring Fourth
Amendment violations,' 82 the Court's move away from the rule
potentially opens the door to a vast restructuring of the power
balance between individuals and the state. Even those, like Justice
Scalia, who feel that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule only
protects the guilty1 83 (a crass characterization) should recognize
that guilty people are of course still entitled to the effective
protection of their rights, and that the integrity of the criminal
181. See supra Part I.C.1.
182. See Kamisar, supra note 126, at 126-29.
183. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment
has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal
(through the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citizen
remotely if at all. By failing to protect the innocent arrestee, today's opinion
reinforces that view.").
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justice system is denigrated when the government is allowed to
retain the advantages of evidence seized unconstitutionally. 8 4 The
idea that the government can knowingly violate an individual's
constitutional rights and yet incur no meaningful penalty (such as
the exclusion of evidence from trial) is fundamentally antithetical
to a constitutional order premised on individual liberty. Civil
remedies do not appear to offer sufficient disincentives for
government actors to forgo unconstitutional behavior when real
damages are slight, and may not speak to the actual harm
inflicted.18 5 Such questions of government power and individual
liberty--and the tradeoffs that must be made to accommodate the
needs of both---come to light dramatically in exclusionary rule
cases, which is why such cases like Hudson operate as effective
barometers of the Court's more fundamental inclinations.'86
C. The Court's Other First-Term Criminal Procedure Cases
Confirm This Observation
Hudson and Samson were the starkest examples in the Roberts
Court's first term of the Justices' predilections on these
fundamental questions. The "minor" Fourth Amendment cases
decided by the new Court in its first term do nothin to undermine
these observations. In United States v. Grubbs,'1 a unanimous
Court (argued before Justice Alito joined the bench) held that
"anticipatory warrants" are not per se unconstitutional, a holding in
accord with every federal circuit that had considered the
184. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 142, at 849 ("By stripping the
wrongdoer of all gain, a court provides a deterrent against future misconduct. In
addition, disgorgement also makes clear a court's unwillingness to countenance
wrongful behavior.").
185. See supra Part II.C.1, for a discussion on the inefficacy of civil
remedies to deter Fourth Amendment violations.
186. Oliver, supra note 77 (citing Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to
Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121
U. PA. L. REv. 506, 575 (1973) ("The exclusionary rule only makes this conflict
(reliable fact-finding vs. the concern for individual rights) obvious. Any
protection of individual rights against police tactics that produce reliable
evidence will have this effect.")).
187. 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006).
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question. 188 In Brigham City v. Stuart,189 the Court unanimously
held that police who witnessed a fight through a screen door could
enter the home under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the
warrant requirement. 190 In Georgia v. Randolph,191 the Court held
5-4 that a warrantless search of the home is invalid as to a
"physically present co-occupant" who refuses to consent to police
entry. 1
92
In Randolph, the need to properly weigh the ethereal concepts
of individual privacy, autonomy, and dignity with the concrete
interest of government in law enforcement pervades Justice
Souter's majority opinion.
Yes, we recognize the consenting tenant's interest as a
citizen in bringing criminal activity to light .. . [a]nd we
understand a co-tenant's legitimate self-interest in siding
with the police to deflect suspicion raised by sharing
quarters with a criminal... [b]ut society can often have the
benefit of these interests without relying on a theory of
consent that ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a
warrantless search. 1
93
Once again, Justice Kennedy was the deciding fifth vote, leaving
the conservative bloc in this case to sign on to the majority opinion
joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered a strong dissent, arguing that
majority's formulation of society's expectations of privacy is
without compelling support, and that the risks to effective law
enforcement and prevention of domestic violence override the
slight gains to privacy. He emphasized that privacy is curtailed
once the information sought (for instance, the presence of drugs in
the home) has been disclosed to others, even if disclosed only to a
co-habitant or family member. "The Constitution ... protects...
privacy, and once privacy has been shared, the shared information,
188. Id. at 1499 (citing United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 364 (3d Cir.
1999) (collecting cases)).
189. 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006).
190. Id. at 1949.
191. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
192. Id. at 1518-19.
193. Id. at 1524.
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documents, or places remain private only at the discretion of the
confidant.' ' 194 Of interest here, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly
played out the "minor imposition, severe consequences" balancing
act in support of broader government power, just as the majority
(of which he joined) did in Samson and Hudson: "Just as the
source of the majority's rule is not privacy, so too the interest it
protects cannot reasonably be described as such .... While the
majority's rule protects something random, its consequences are
particularly severe."'1 95 He argued that while privacy in shared
living arrangements is already attenuated (because, for instance, a
co-occupant can effectively consent to search if the other is
absent), the risks of evidence destruction and domestic violence are
high. 196
Again, whether or not one agrees with the outcome in
Randolph, what is clear from the opinions is that the conservative
bloc adheres to a balancing jurisprudence that de-emphasizes
individual privacy by juxtaposing supposedly minor impositions
with great, often speculative, social harms. This fully comports
with the decisions arising out of Hudson and Samson.
D. Samson and Hudson: Implications Going Forward
Aside from the very real concerns about the Court's doctrinal
shift on privacy and autonomy in the "regular" criminal context,
Samson and Hudson offer clues about the Court's direction in the
coming "new generation" of cases that go beyond the traditional
boundaries of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 97 Such emerging
issues include the warrantless wiretapping of American-based
telephone users by national intelligence agencies, 198 suspicionless
194. Id. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1536-37.
196. Id
197. See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 279, 279 (2005) (arguing that the collection of digital
evidence requires a new conception of criminal procedure jurisprudence).
198. David Stout, Federal Judge Orders End to Warrantless Wiretapping,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at Al; see David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the
Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced
Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol, 47
[Vol. 68
2007] HUDSON AND SAMSON: THE ROBERTS COURT 113
searches of individuals on public transportation, 199 new methods of
internet surveillance, 200 the increasing use of public surveillance
cameras,20 1 data mining,20 2 and so forth. While many of these cases
will hinge on areas of law apart from pure Fourth Amendment
reasonableness calculations, all of them will require the Court (or
lower courts looking for Supreme Court guidance on the issue) to
make fundamental determinations about the proper balance between
personal privacy and autonomy and the interests of government in
law enforcement. Courts will have to make, even if just implicitly, a
determination about the values underlying the Fourth Amendment's
basic command that all searches and seizures be reasonable, and will
have to apply specific rules and tests to make such determinations.
Samson and Hudson offer a compelling preview of a majority of the
new Court's attitude on the fundamental reasonableness calculus
common to all these issues. Given the Court's formulation of the
balancing test, the government's interest will almost always seem
more compelling when the threat of violence or the loss of evidence203
is at stake, and the imposition on a given individual (which
B.C. L. REv. 505 (2006) (exploring the legal issues surrounding the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program).
199. Timothy Williams & Sewell Chan, In New Security Move, New York
Police to Search Commuters'Bags, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at Al.
200. Declan McCullagh, FBI Plans New Net-Tapping Push, CNET
NEWS.COM, July 7, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6091942.html.
201. Judy Keen, Daley Wants Security Cameras at Bars, USA TODAY, Feb.
15, 2006, at A3.
202. Mark Clayton, US. Plans Massive Data Sweep, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2006, at 1.
203. Kamisar, supra note 126, at 486-87 (discussing the skew of the Court's
balancing test in the context of the exclusionary rule):
The "costs" of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent-the
"freeing" of a "plainly guilty" drug dealer--but the "benefits" of the
rule are hard to grasp. One could say that the benefits "involve
safeguarding a zone of dignity and privacy for every citizen, controlling
abuses of power [and] preserving checks and balances." And one could
regard these goals as "pretty weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable
ones." But the Court has not done so. Instead, it has viewed the
benefits of the rule "as abstract [and] speculative." On the other hand,
the Court has underscored what it thinks are the severe costs of the rule.
Thus, it has called the rule a "drastic measure," an "extreme sanction,"
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oftentimes will be one who is clearly guilty of something) will
almost always seem small by comparison, given the amorphous
nature of those underlying values.
Going forward, petitioners seeking to challenge government
actions using Fourth Amendment reasonableness arguments will
have to go above and beyond, as it were, to show that the challenged
intrusion outweighs the law enforcement benefits, because at least
five members of the High Court,20 4 including its newest members
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, can be expected to default to
the position that the government's law enforcement interests usually
trumps that of the individual's interest in privacy and autonomy.
This is especially true given that this "new generation" of cases will
present issues of personal privacy not well embedded in the
constitutional tradition. Does a person give up the right not to be
filmed by government security cameras when he goes out into
public? Are random searches of commuters' bags reasonable given
the threat of terrorism? Does a person give up the right not to be
"data mined" if they voluntarily share information on the Internet?
The answers are not obvious given current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. However, given the conservative bloc's formulation
of the "reasonableness" inquiry in more "core" Fourth Amendment
cases like Samson, Hudson, and Randolph, one can expect that
petitioners seeking to expand the Amendment's protections into new
realms will have a heavy, perhaps insurmountable, burden.
CONCLUSION
Much has been-and will be-written about the Supreme
Court's opening salvo against the exclusionary rule in Hudson.20 5
a rule that "exacts a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the
truth in a criminal case," and one whose application is "contrary to the
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice."
(citations omitted).
204. While Justice Ginsburg joined in the Samson decision, it is questionable
whether she fully supports the conservative bloc's Fourth Amendment
inclinations as described here.
205. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule,
42-DEC Trial 56, 59 (2006) ("The better way to have handled this issue would
have been to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not require knock-and-
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However, a true accounting of the Roberts Court's initial forays into
the broader Fourth Amendment realm cannot be had without
accounting for Samson as well. Taken together, a broader
jurisprudence begins to appear in focus, and lessons for future
petitioners can be gleaned. In the crudest measure, the Roberts
Court came down strongly in favor of the government in its first
term Fourth Amendment cases, four decisions to one. And as to that
one case decided against the government, Randolph, at least one
commentator has questioned the precedential force of the decision
given the majority opinion's narrow scope and the existing
exceptions to the consent requirement.
20 6
Going forward, challenges to government action in the Fourth
Amendment context will have a high hurdle to overcome, because
the presumption exists among at least five members of the Court
that the governmental interest in law enforcement (specifically
crime prevention and evidence gathering) will usually trump the
individual's interest in privacy. This "thumb on the scale" method
of constitutional adjudication de-emphasizes the individual's right to
a certain sphere of privacy or autonomy that cannot be (or at least
should not be) constitutionally invaded without a warrant. This
government-preferred formulation will play a large role in the "next
generation" Fourth Amendment cases sure to come before the
Roberts Court in the near future, each of which requires the Court to
balance an individual's privacy interests with the government's
desire to conduct searches or surveillance on less than probable
cause.
207
announce. Now, the Court has put itself in the disreputable position of solemnly
declaring a Fourth Amendment right and then inviting police officers to violate
it, while providing no realistic remedy for violations."); Fourth Amendment-
Exclusionary Rule-Knock and Announce Violations, 120 HARv. L. REv. 173,
182-83 (2006) ("The question remains whether, having laid the groundwork, the
Court will actually get rid of the exclusionary rule .... Hudson is a strong signal
that the exclusionary rule is in trouble."); Moran, supra note 91, at 283-84.
206. Moran, supra note 91, at 291-92 ("The holding of Justice Souter's
majority opinion is so narrowly drawn that it will apply only to a handful of
cases every year . . . .The real world impact of Randolph is exceedingly
slight.").
207. See supra Part III.D.
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Wrangling over these issues is not new; all of this is merely a
recasting of the ever-present "freedom versus security" argument
that is, in a certain sense, the fundamental issue of governance,
politics, and law. Neither are these issues new in the context of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment and criminal procedure
jurisprudence. Much has been written about the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' retrenchment of Warren-era expansion of
constitutional protections for criminals and the accused. What is
most important at this juncture is that the Roberts Court, in just its
first term, has signaled clearly where it stands on the issue of
personal autonomy and privacy when those values conflict with law
enforcement prerogatives. Justice Breyer had it half right in Hudson
when he said that "[tihe majority's 'substantial social costs'
argument is an argument against the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary principle itself." 9  The truth is broader; the
conservative bloc's balancing test is an argument against a
protective Fourth Amendment in general. Whether this tilt will
carry over into other areas of law, both within the traditional Fourth
Amendment sphere and without, remains to be seen.
208. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2006) (arguing that
although the record is mixed, "the conventional wisdom about the Rehnquist
Court is that its dominant mission in criminal law was to overrule or limit cases
from the Warren Court era in order to cut back on criminal procedure
protections"); Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the Conservative
Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1350 (2006) ("During the last third of the
twentieth century, we witn(Wsed what I favor calling a 'conservative
reformation' in constitutional criminal justice. The conservative reformation
was the product of social, cultural, and political forces that arose in opposition to
the liberal criminal justice decisions of the Warren and early Burger Courts,
unrest in the streets and on the campuses, and increasing crime."); Kamisar,
supra note 126, at 485 ("Although not all post-Warren Court search and seizure
rulings have been in favor of the government, in the main the Court has
significantly reduced the impact of the exclusionary rule in both respects.");
Carol S. Steiker, Counter Revolution in Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466 (1996) (exploring division among
scholars regarding the impact of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts on of criminal
procedure jurisprudence).
209. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2177 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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